2 Had the doctrine of separation of powers been understood from the beginning to bar any judicial control of administrative power, the constitutional scheme would have gone seriously awry at the outset. Congressional directives either would have been subordinated to the will of the executive department or would have generated collateral and unseemly struggles between the two branches of government. 3 Moreover, a conception of public administration free from judicial oversight would have damaged the fundamental political axiom of limited government and thus undermined in advance a principal buttress for the legitimacy of the modern "administrative state." ' 4 At least where private interests are sharply implicated, some measure of judicial review is a "necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid." '5 These concerns seem to have been acknowledged even by those specialists in public administration most prominently associated with efforts to narrow the claims for judicial control in favor of an emphasis on hierarchically structured, intra-administrative accountability. 6 The existence of judicial review of administrative action leaves open a large question about its scope. Marbury has relevance here too, for it is among the Court's first encounters with the propriety of judicial deference to administrative interpretation of statutes. In determining whether Mr. Marbury was legally entitled to his commission, the Court asserted categorically that "ihe question whether a right [to the commission] has vested or not is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority." ' 7 There is no hint of acquiescence in a reasonable but contrary administrative interpretation of the relevant congressional legislation" in Marbury's much quoted pronouncement that "[iut is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 9 Marshall's grand conception of judicial autonomy in law declaration was not in terms or in logic limited to constitutional interpretation, and taken at face value seemed to condemn the now entrenched practice of judicial deference to administrative construction of law. It is Marbury's pertinence to this practice that I intend to examine in this Article.
I. Ti PROBLEM ELABORATED
Despite its landmark status in administrative law, Marbury had all but disappeared from sight amidst the amazing proliferation of twentieth-century administrative law cases. Its relevance on the question of the scope of review of administrative interpretation of law suddenly resurfaced, however, in the debates over Senator Dale Bumpers's crusade to curb judicial deference to statutory interpretation made by federal administrative agencies. In 1975, Senator Bumpers proposed to modify the Administrative Procedure Act to require, inter alia, that "the reviewing court shall de novo decide all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions."' 1 "The Bumpers amendment is simple," said Senator Exon, one of its supporters, "[i]t takes away the now court-recognized principle that a Federal agency's interpretation of Federal law is presumed to be correct."" While the precise demands of the various forms of the Bumpers amendment have been viewed by many as anything but simple,' 2 my concern is with 739, 742-43 (1982) (suggesting open administrative procedures coupled with "oversight ... by Congress, experts in various disciplines, and the public").
7. 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) at 167. 8. That the right did not vest until delivery of the commission was certainly a plausible view. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 47 (1932) ("[Tihe Executive Department has not always treated an appointment as complete upon the mere signing of a commission." (footnote omitted)).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 10. S. 2408, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (intended to amend 5 U.S.C. § 706). This requirement was joined with a prohibition against a judicial presumption "that any rule or regulation of any agency is valid."
11. 125 Cong. Rec. S12,165 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979) . Senator Exon was referring to a slightly different version of the proposed amendment, appearing at id. at S12, 145 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W its animating no-judicial-deference principle. Trumpeted as a necessary check upon federal bureaucratic insensitivity and unresponsiveness,'
3 it was on occasion supported by references to Marbury. The "duty of the judicial department" there posited, it was insisted, prohibits any judicial deference to administrative interpretation of law. 14 As Senator Bumpers put it, " [u] nder this amendment, the judiciary will simply be required to carry out exactly what their duty is; that is, where they would have reached a different conclusion, it is their duty to reach a different conclusion."'
5
While never more than a makeweight in the debates over the amendment, the Marbury argument is considerably more interesting than acknowledged by its somewhat perplexed opponents.' 6 Thirty years ago Professor Henry Hart, also invoking Marbury, advanced a strikingly similar, albeit more limited, "no-deference" thesis as part of his "Dialogue" on congressional power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 17 The Dialogue is widely and rightly praised, but its votaries pay no heed to the strictures Hart thought were required in judicial review of administrative construction of law; in fact, this strand of the Dialogue seems universally to have been ignored.
But the problem it addresses cannot be ignored. The propriety of judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is an issue of systemic importance to the theory and practice of administrative law.' 8 The case law seems inconsistent. As in Marbury, the Court frequently proffers its own judgment on the meaning of the statute, considering the agency position simply as a relevant 13. Amendment supporters reflected both business and grassroots opposition to what was perceived to be the excesses of the federal bureaucracy. In contrast, the amendment's opponents have tended to be drawn from those, including academics and judges, still retaining confidence in a system of national policy making. O'Reilly, supra note 12, at 749-56.
14. E.g., 122 Cong. 18. There are, I recognize, those who deny that court-agency interaction can be helpfully understood in terms of such concepts as judicial deference to administrative interpretation of law. E.g., Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 771, 780-81 (1975) ("The rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape .... "). Some modern-day writers would, indeed, dismiss such an issue as simply masking the real determinant of judicial conduct: acceptability of result. Any such judicial conduct-and no one doubts that there is some, if not so much as the realists believe-is, however, normatively unacceptable. Whether in the hands of judges or scholars, such a result-oriented jurisprudence does not provide a theory of adjudication; in reducing the judicial role to that of another political organ, it does not tell us what judges should do if they are to be faithful to their commissions as judges.
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW "body of experience and informed judgment."' 1 On other occasions, however, the Court seems willing to be bound by the administrative interpretation, so long as it has a "reasonable basis in law," ' 20 or "is not irrational." 2 '
In part, the apparently erratic pattern of the case law reflects the indeterminacy in the concepts of "law" and "deference." Indeed, some commentators would insist that the term "law" cannot be adequately differentiated from related concepts, with the result that it cannot meaningfully serve as a vehicle for allocating functions between court and agency. 2 2 No doubt this epistemological skepticism has merit in emphasizing the difficulties endemic to our legal categories.
2 3 But these categories can be neither discarded as vestigal remains of primitive word magic, nor dissolved by appeals to epistemology, or, I might add, to literary theory. 2 4 They are practical constructs designed to systematize, order, and control certain forms of social experience. 25 The concept of a "legal question" is a centrally important ordering device for allocating and distributing regulative authority among the various actors in the legal system. That this concept does not explain or answer everything does not mean that it does not illuminate anything. I am not persuaded that it is so hazy that it should be discarded in thinking about judicial review of administrative action, 2 6 and I take comfort in the fact that, unless they are dissemblers, judges of the first rank are of a similar persuasion.
27
The notion of deference is also troublesome. It is not a well-defined concept but rather an umbrella that has been used to cover a variety of judicial [Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W approaches. Indeed, we are admonished to view deference as a complex phenomenon best understood "as a collection of rules of statutory construction, any of which may be applicable depending upon the circumstances of the particular case." 28 For our purposes, however, more precision is necessary. As Professor Byse says, "[t]he question is not whether the agency's interpretation shall be 'considered' or 'taken into account.' The precise problem is the extent to which the agency's interpretation shall affect or control the court's interpretation.
2 9 Deference, to be meaningful, imports agency displacement of what might have been the judicial view res nova-in short, administrative displacement of judicial judgment. Where there is meaningful deference, the agency, not the court, supplies at least part of the meaning of the law. Deference in this sense includes judicial decisions purporting to accept "reasonable" agency statutory construction," 0 as well as judicial use of deference principles to resolve statutory "uncertainty"-a tie-breaker, so to speakinvoked when the court accepts the agency interpretation because it is satisfied that there is no one "correct" resolution of the statute's meaning. 3 ' These formulations involve deference in a strong sense.
Statutes must, of course, be initially interpreted by the administrative officials charged with their enforcement. But, as Professor Vile says:
The difference between these interpretations and those of the judge, however, is the authoritative quality of the judicial interpretation, whereas those of other officials, although usually accepted as valid, are in principle subject to review. The importance of this distinction cannot be lost sight of in the constitutional system of government,. . .[otherwise] we should indeed live in a society in which the bureaucrat, however benevolent, had the last word.
32
Our inquiry is the extent to which the Constitution controls the allocation of functions between court and administrative agency in statutory interpretation. Suppose, therefore, that Congress were to enact a reverse Bumpers amendment-making explicit that a court must accept every published administrative statutory interpretation so long as it has a "reasonable basis in law," and, if you wish, so long as the "subjects fall within the agency's jurisdiction." Such a statute might constitute unwise policy and might on occasion offend some specific constitutional provision, such as the first or fifth amendments. But does Marbury stand as a general constitutional interdiction of such an appor-28. See Woodward & Levin, supra note 12, at 333. 29. Byse, supra note 27, at 191 (emphasis added).
As Professor Byse puts it:
Closely related to the judicial practice of accepting the agency's statutory interpretation unless it is irrational or unreasonable is the often stated formula that the reviewing court will accord "deference" or "great deference" to the agency's interpretation. I believe that if these terms are to be given their ordinary or dictionary meanings, (and I see no reason why they should not be so understood), they 
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW tionment of functions? If it does, the legitimacy of much of the present structure of the American system of administrative law is called into question.
I think the Marbury argument fails, and an understanding of why that is so throws some light on the basic premises of our system of judicial review. My submission, in brief, is this: judicial review in both constitutional and administrative law involves textual interpretation by the courts. In constitutional adjudication, 33 Marbury indicates that the court's interpretational duty is that of supplying the full meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions (except for "political questions"). By contrast, judicial review of administrative action contains a question of the allocation of law-making competence in every case, given congressional power to delegate law-making authority to administrative agencies. The court's interpretational task is (enforcement of constitutional restrictions aside) to determine the boundaries of delegated authority. A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administrative "interpretation" of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency. Where deference exists, the court must specify the boundaries of agency authority, within which the agency is authorized to fashion authoritatively part, often a large part, of the meaning of the statute. By contrast, to the extent that the court interprets the statute to direct it to supply meaning, it interprets the statute to exclude delegated administrative law-making power. In this context, the agency view of what the statute means may persuade, but it cannot control, judicial judgment.
A road map for what follows may prove helpful. Part II emphasizes the pervasiveness of the requirement that the Court independently determine the meaning of the Constitution. The origins of this rule are traced to Marbury's premise that the judicial role in constitutional adjudication is not distinctive but simply an extrapolation from the traditional judicial role in nonconstitutional settings. Part III considers why the Court has not over time seen the "judicial duty" as inconsistent with deference to administrative construction of law. It suggests that the principal reason was the early emergence of a distinction between "public" and "private" rights. This distinction initially permitted claims against the government to be adjudicated in nonarticle III tribunals, and it was ultimately extended to permit administrative adjudication, at least initially, of all claims generated by the administrative state, even those between private parties. Several decisions indicated, however, that whenever an article III court was being asked to enforce governmentally prescribed duties against private parties the "judicial duty" requires indepen- [Vol. 83:1 dent judicial determination of all questions of law. Part IV elaborates upon that latter theme, particularly in connection with Henry Hart's effort to frame the appropriateness of judicial deference as a function of a distinction between "enforcement courts" and article III courts acting in other contexts. Part IV concludes by criticizing the coherence and utility of Hart's distinction. Part V argues that once the delegation of law-making competence to administrative agencies is recognized as permissible, judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is simply one way of recognizing such a delegation. The Article concludes in Part VI by suggesting that the central constitutional problem is that of vindicating the values of limited government, that our tradition is that the court's role is simply to keep the administrative agencies within the boundaries of delegated power, and that in fact this circumscribed role is not unlike the judicial role in much constitutional adjudication as well.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION AND THE

INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Rule
Marshall's emphasis on the law-declaring "duty of the judicial department" is a cornerstone of the American constitutional order. 34 Thayer's general argument for limited review may need some additional fine tuning. In some situations, such as the sixth amendment, it is at least arguable that the courts themselves are the primary addressees of the constitutional mandate. Indeed, such an argument could be made with respect to the issue presented in 
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW tion reflected the common understanding of how judicial review would actually operate under the new Constitution; in pronouncing an act invalid, a court would simply be ratifying a legal conclusion readily apparent to everyone from the face of the Constitution, 39 as, for example, judicial invalidation of an act establishing a national church. Arguably too, Thayer's formula draws some support from early decisions of the Supreme Court. 4 0 But in the end it has proved too simplistic. Twentieth-century efforts to develop a stable, coherent body of constitutional doctrine have generated modes of reasoning and the elaboration of doctrinal distinctions that Thayer could not have countenanced or perhaps even have imagined. 4 ' Marbury itself, our most important decision, cuts hard against Thayer's standard. In Marbury, it will be recalled, the Court invalidated section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act 42 as an impermissible attempt to enlarge the Court's original jurisdiction beyond the three categories specifically named in article I11. 43 Powerful, and to my mind convincing, arguments can be made that the named categories stated only the irreducible minimum, not the maximum, of original jurisdiction. 44 Surely, at least, Congress could not be charged with a "clear mistake" on this issue. 45 But the Court did not posit "the duty of the judicial department" in such restricted terms. The question of congressional power to expand the original jurisdiction was a straightforwardly "legal" one, and the Court saw its duty as requiring independent judgment on the meaning of article III. There was no suggestion that this obligation could be discharged 39 . See Thayer, supra note 35, at 133-34 (quoting Swift, System of the Laws of Connecticut 50 (1795), denying judicial review except of acts "so manifestly unconstitutional that it would seem wrong to require the judges to regard it in their decisions"). See also R. Berger, supra note 38, at 335-46 (judicial review intended to reach only plain acts of unconstitutionality).
40 [Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W by judicial deference to Congress simply because its interpretation had a "reasonable basis in law."
Viewed simply as a matter of logic, the judicial duty "to say what the law is" does not demand an independent judgment rule; it is in fact quite consistent with a clear-mistake standard. For example, the political question doctrine, such as it is,46 most properly represents a judicial conclusion that the meaning of a constitutional provision has been allocated by the Constitution to another branch of government. 47 To be sure, this commitment-to-anotherbranch rationale necessitates some judicial interpretation, including a requirement that the Court specify the boundaries of what has been allocated elsewhere. But this process entails judicial interpretation of a limited order, and, more importantly, it acknowledges that some of the meaning of a constitutional provision can be authoritatively supplied by another branch of government. The point can be put more generally: the judicial duty "to say what the law is" is analytically empty. The judicial duty to decide demands nothing with respect to the scope of judicial review; it is, therefore, entirely consistent with such propositions as, "the Constitution means what Congress says it means, so long as the congressional determination is a reasonable one." '48 But here, as elsewhere, Holmes's page of history is worth a volume of logic. 49 The Court and the profession have treated the judicial duty as requiring independent judgment, not deference, when the decisive issue turns on the meaning of the constitutional text, 50 and that specific conception of the judicial duty is now deeply engrained in our constitutional order. 47. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1959); Henkin, supra note 46, at 600-01, 606, 612. Compare G. Gunther, supra note 33, at 1688-96, arguing that the political question doctrine comprises more than simply, as Wechsler argues, textual commitments to other branches; it includes cases where there is a lack of judicially manageable standards. But even if this were true, the conclusion would be the same: the task of giving content to the meaning of the constitutional provisions has been committed to a nonjudicial organ.
48 
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW ently deferred to a "reasonable" congressional interpretation of the equal protection clause, 53 a dissenting opinion 54 and commentators 5 5 voiced objection and this aspect of Morgan simply withered. 6 Efforts by sponsors of the so-called "Human Life Statute ' 5 7 to overturn Roe v. Wade 8 by ordinary legislation have encountered a similar condemnation. In discharging its duty to say what the law is, the Court had, it was noted, squarely held that a fetus was not a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses. 59 Legislative judgments to the contrary, however reasonable, are simply constitutionally out-of-bounds. 60 Two concluding points concerning the judicial duty in constitutional adjudication bear emphasis in view of the discussion that follows. First, the judicial duty to supply all the relevant meaning of the constitutional text may, at first glance, seem attributable to the binary nature of the issues presented: either Congress can or it cannot enlarge the original jurisdiction, regulate the manufacturing process under the commerce clause, or reach private conduct under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. With respect to issues of this character, it is hard to think of the Court as simply prescribing boundaries for the political branches, leaving to them the ultimate ordering of judicially approved criteria. But much of the Court's work in supplying the meaning of consitutional provisions does not involve simple binary choice. Consider, for [Vol. 83:1 example, the diverse range of possible rules governing warrantless searches and seizures, procedural safeguards required by due process in the administrative context, media defamation, or state aid to parochial schools. Here, too, the Court has undertaken to specify the precise content of what is required by the Constitution. 61 Second, there is no suggestion that the judicial duty of article III courts "to say what the law is" with regard to constitutional questions varies with the nature of the case in which the question arises. Thus, no one supposes that Congress could confine judicial inquiry into any such questions arising in, say, a case challenging the denial of a government benefit, to a determination whether Congress had made a clear mistake. 62 There is no half-way position in constitutional cases; so long as it is directed to decide the case, an article III court cannot be "jurisdictionally" shut off from full consideration of the substantive constitutional issues, at least absent adequate opportunity for consideration of those claims in another article III tribunal. 63 Whether the court can be deprived of jurisdiction over the entire case is an entirely different matter.
64
B. Intellectual Origins
The origins of Marbury's independent judgment rule warrant elaboration. They will seem strange to many contemporary students of the American 
1983]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW political-constitutional order. Nonetheless, they reflect deeply held premises that profoundly affected nineteenth and early twentieth-century thinking about the nature of judicial review, and their impact is still apparent in the case law. 65 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall makes no effort to defend judicial review in terms of the superior institutional capacity of courts to develop a coherent and stable corpus of constitutional doctrine. 00 Nor does he appear to view the substance of constitutional adjudication as special. 0 7 Rather, Marshall simply extrapolates the judicial role in constitutional cases from the "ordinary and humble judicial duty" 6 in conventional cases. Law interpretation is what courts "do":
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case .... the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. 69 Marshall's premise was widely shared. Hamilton, for example, had earlier defended judicial review in virtually identical terms:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. 70 Thus, as Thayer noted, the argument for judicial review "went forward as smoothly as if the constitution were a private letter of attorney, and the court's duty under it were precisely like any of its most ordinary operations.
17 1 Judicial review is no more than "the mere and simple office of In this paradigm, the "meaning" of the relevant constitutional provision is, of course, assumed to be a crucial matter, just as is the meaning of any other controlling legal instrument. Meaning, in turn, is to be supplied entirely by the courts; and in the courthouse there is no room for a "reasonable" but "wrong" interpretation, or for a "no right answer" approach. Rather, as Thayer put it, the premise is that the ultimate question ... is one of the construction of a writing; that this sort of question is always a court's question, and that it cannot well be admitted that there should be two legal constructions of the same instrument; that there is a right way and a wrong way of construing it, and only one right way; and that it is ultimately for the court to say what the right way is. 73 Thus, Marshall's justification for the existence of judicial review, drawn as it is from the ordinary workings of the common law courts, also determined its precise scope: independent judgment. 74 Thayer decried the assimilation of constitutional to ordinary adjudication. He insisted that the courts too had quickly perceived the wide and evident dissimilarities between the two kinds of cases, 75 and as a result had rightly "supplemented" Marbury's "simple precepts" with "a very significant rule of administration" 7 6 -the clear-mistake standard. But in Thayer's hands emphasis on that standard constituted an attempt to restructure the institution of judicial review as it had evolved from its early nineteenthcentury origins. Early expressions of the clear-mistake standard, and there were many, 77 assumed that courts would independently determine the "meaning" of the relevant constitutional text. By the time Thayer wrote, however, these conceptions connoted quite incompatible judicial roles in constitutional adjudication. In stressing the clear-mistake standard, Thayer sought to redirect the focus of judicial review from "meaning" to "validity. properly concerned only with whether the congressional conduct has a "reasonable basis in law." The clear-mistake standard recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional. This is the principle which the rule that I have been illustrating affirms and supports. 1 9
But Thayer's effort to divorce meaning from validity, however plausible, has not prevailed. Meaning and validity are joined, not separated, in our system of judicial review. And meaning is a matter for the "judicial department," not Congress. 8 " (This, at least, is the formal doctrine, although, as I shall show in Part VI, it oversimplifies the complexities of constitutional adjudication.)
III. MARBURY, PuBLIc ADMINISTRATION AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
Marbury's justification for judicial review, grounded as it is in the "ordinary and humble judicial duty" of the common law courts, seems necessarily to entail a general obligation of independent law-exposition by article III courts. This is what courts "do"; it is their "job." Thus it is part of the nondisclaimable "judicial power" of courts established under article III. Indeed, in view of Marbury's derivation of the right of judicial review from the workings of the courts in ordinary cases, judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is plainly anomalous. Applied systematically to the field of public administration, the essentially common-law conception of the judicial duty would have established a strong basis for judicial control of administrative law-interpretation. For, unlike the legislature, administrative agencies can never pretend to an unlimited power to select among goals; the universe of each agency is limited by the legislative specifications contained in its organic act.
But whatever the logic of the Marbury argument or the wisdom of strong judicial control of administrative law-making, the Marshall court itself gave early sanction to deference principles. United States v. Vowell " I was a suit to enforce a bond given for custom duties owed on salt, and the case turned on when the duty had accrued. Chief Justice Marshall's one paragraph opinion for the Court noted that " [Vol. 83:1
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have respected the uniform construction which it is understood has been given by the treasury department of the United States upon similar questions." 8 2
Marbury is not mentioned in that opinion, nor is it mentioned in the other scattered deference opinions of the Marshall Court.
8 3 As the nineteenth century wore on, and public administration became a larger and larger component of the American governmental system, judicial expressions of deference increased.
8 4 Marbury proved no barrier to this development. Marbury's lack of impact on administrative interpretation of law seems, in significant measure, to be part of a much larger development construing narrowly the potential demands of article 111.85 Article III could have been read to require that, at least in the states if not the territories, Congress must assign all the adjudicatory business specified in article III to the courts established under its authority or to the state courts.
8 6 But the Court quickly concluded that some adjudication could take place outside of article III (or state) courts: "public rights"-claims by private individuals against the government and certain claims by the government against private parties for such matters as custom duties and, perhaps, taxes but a small step to a conclusion that, where those courts were utilized, deference was permissible. Such an inference does not follow, however. There is, in principle, a clear difference between excluding the article III courts entirely from a case and restricting their law-declaring competence once "judicial power" is, in fact, brought to bear on a controversy. 9 ' Be that as it may, throughout most of the nineteenth century there was, despite Marbury, only limited judicial control of administrative law-interpretation. Judicial control was at its maximum when coercive governmental conduct was involved, particularly where, as in the customs and tax areas, the judicial process itself was utilized to enforce the duties of private persons. To be sure, expressions of deference were common enough in this context, but they were of uncertain import. Often they amounted to little more than a statement that the administrative view should be taken into account. And although the administrative view seemed, on occasion, to tip the judicial scales, it seems fair to say that the cases fell well short of judicial acceptance of a clear-mistake standard.
92
Judicial control of noncoercive government conduct, particularly administrative denial of government benefits, was another matter. 9 3 Judicial review could have been entirely excluded with respect to such claims, 4 and where it was available it was of a limited nature. Mandamus and injunction actions seeking to review administrative interpretation of law in connection with the denial of pensions, land grants, and other largesse were frequently barred by the rule that these remedies reached only the violation of plain, nondiscretionary administrative duties. 5 Sovereign immunity may have played a large role in the emergence of these deference principles. It cannot explain judicial deference completely, however, for "public rights" included certain claims by the government against private parties. E.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
95. Lee, supra note 93, at 296. See also L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 337-38. The influences of these remedial concepts persisted well into the twentieth century. Lee, supra note 93, at 297 n.31. Cf. id. at 304 (discussing the Court's tendency after the turn of the century to defer to administrative fact-determination).
96. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 514-16 (1840). The Court was late in coming to recognize that discretion has its boundaries, and that the crucial issue was the scope of agency discretion. See Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925).
[Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW tion extended to questions of law. Any other rule, the Court said, would sanction excessive judicial intrusion into the domain of public administration. 97 History, if not logic, is thus squarely against the wide assertion of Bumpers amendment proponents that article III courts can never yield to administrative constructions of law. But there has always been in our traditions particular concern with the judicial role where governmental interference with the "private rights" of "liberty" and "property" was involved.
8 This linkage is reflected in Marbury's declaration that the "province of the Court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals," '9 and it constituted a vital component in nineteenth-and early twentieth-century efforts at demarcating the permissible limits of administrative power. So long as public administration made few demands on private persons (apart from taxes and custom duties) no threat was posed to the "sacred" rights of liberty and property. But with the advent of the regulatory administrative state in the late nineteenth century, 00 judicial concern grew. It was a widely shared belief that disputes arising from the application of congressional regulatory power must ultimately be resolved in article III courts and thus could not be left for final administrative determination.' 0 ' Judicial power and due process rationales were tightly joined here;1 0 2 in fact, the first decision imposing due process constraints on the states required judicial review of a claim that administratively prescribed rates were confiscatory. 97. Justice Catron's elaborate concurring opinion disclaimed any judicial supervisions of claims "to pay money out of the treasury" on this ground, Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 518 (1840), and his concern was reflected in the majority opinion. "We can readily imagine," said Chief Justice Taney, "the confusion and disorder into which [more active judicial intervention] would throw the whole subject ... ; which now forms so large a portion of the annual expenditure of government, and is distributed among such a multitude of individuals." Id. at 515.
Mr. Lee notes that between 1838 and 1880 the Court failed to order mandamus with respect to any executive action. Lee, supra note 87, at 295. Note, however, that even if direct review were not permissible, it appears that the legal issue could have been litigated in a private action where the court would not have been bound by prior administrative decisions on law. Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 515. See also L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 338.
98. Thus Professor Jaffe, in his plea for recognition of "public" actions, "categorically and arbitrarily assert[s] that the highest, the central, and the most realizable function of our courts is the protection and relief of the individual." L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 475. 99. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (emphasis added). See also id. at 162-63, 167 (stressing judicial protection for vested rights). The linkage is, indeed, rooted in English history, L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 330, and accepted by writers on public administration, see supra note 6. 100. While the federal administrative process existed in rudimentary form in 1789, it is "customary and appropriate to date the present federal [administrative] era from the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887." L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 9.
101. See Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 912-17 (1930). 102. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 379-80. See also R. Berger, supra note 38, at 16-22 (discussing the historical background concerning protection of private rights); Katz, supra note 101, at 917 (same result under article III even if fifth amendment had never been adopted). As Professor Jaffe notes, a judicial power rationale is not theoretically confined to the protection of individual interests, but its use beyond that sphere raises separation-of-powers problems. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 380. 
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The tension between the demands of public administration and the judicial protection of private rights is reflected in Crowell v. Benson, 04 the most important modern decision. But Crowell recognized that it was now too late to cut back significantly the necessary apparatus of the modern state. It not only reconfirmed the public right cases, but it went still further, permitting, subject to limited judicial review, administrative adjudication of the duty of one private person to another arising out of governmental regulatory programs. Crowell, in sum, sanctioned a wide area for the operation of public administration, removing article III as a meaningful barrier to the use of administrative agencies to establish and enforce, at least initially, all the rights created by the administrative state. 0 5 It bears noting that the complex opinions in last term's Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 1 0 confirm Crowell. There the defendant successfully resisted an ordinary breach of contract suit brought in a nonarticle III bankruptcy court by a corporation in reorganization. A divided court concluded that the exercise of such jurisdiction violated article III because it "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Article III district court."' 1 0 7 But the difficult plurality opinion not only purported to reaffirm the public rights cases, 1 0 but also emphasized, 09 as did the concurring opinion," 0 that the claim sued upon did not originate in federal statutory law. It appears, therefore, that common law rights must generally be litigated in either article III or state courts, and perhaps cases of governmental claims against private parties and claims of one individual against another arising under federal law constitutionally require the pattern of limited judicial review confirmed by Crowell."' Even so, the crucial point remains and warrants emphasis: administrative agencies can adjudicate, sometimes conclusively, claims created by the administrative state, by and against private persons.
But that fact simply underscores our inquiry. Whether required by the Constitution or not, our system of administrative law typically provides for 104. 285 U.S. 22 (1932 Pipeline as holding that the authority of legislative courts, even when the right being sued upon originates in a federal statute, "extends neither to interpreting the law nor to entering judgment; these " 'essential attributes of the judicial power' " must remain with article III judges" (citation omitted)).
A footnote in the plurality opinion, id. at 2870 n.23, suggested that judicial review might be required even in cases of government largesse, a suggestion sharply at variance with the decided cases, see supra note 95, but one that draws some support from recent due process developments in the administrative context. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires evidentiary hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and may require judicial review).
[Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W judicial review of the application of administrative power insofar as it directly affects specific individuals. At least when called upon to enforce an administrative order against a private person, must an article III court, as in a constitutional case, independently supply all of the relevant law, or is it sufficient that the court simply determine whether the administrative construction is a reasonable one? In Crowell, Hughes and Brandeis disagreed on whether, "in order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, ' "" 2 an article III court must render independent judgment uponindeed, perhaps independently find-all the "constitutional facts" underlying the administrative order."
3 But both judges stressed that the controlling statute reserved all questions of law, constitutional and nonconstitutional, for independent judicial determination."
4 Indeed, Brandeis subsequently asserted that "[t]he supremacy of law demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule was applied.""1 5 In Yakus v. United States," 6 to take another leading example, the Court sustained a bar to the jurisdiction of an article III court to consider questions of law in a criminal proceeding brought to punish violation of an administrative regulation, but only because full review of those issues had been located in another article III court.
1 7 To be sure, in these cases questions of substantive constitutional law were prominent on the surface, but the Justices did not indicate that they saw any difference in judicial duty between constitutional and conventional legal issues in considering the validity of the administrative orders they 
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW were asked to enforce. These cases thus could be read to support a constitutional interdiction of judicial deference to administrative law-interpretation, at least where a private party was resisting coercive governmental action. "1
IV. THE DALOGUE
A. The Structure
Retaining the traditional concern with the role of the courts in the protection of private interests, Hart's Dialogue is an effort to unpack the notion that a person has a right to invoke judicial aid in challenging illegal governmental conduct affecting him."" While Hart retains the general distinction between coercive and noncoercive governmental conduct, he introduces important refinements. His central innovation is an insistence that the article III courts have special responsibilities when they themselves are the medium for the application of coercive governmental power against private parties-when, in other words, they are being asked to enforce the governmentally prescribed duties of private parties.
Hart begins with the proposition that such an enforcement court can always examine the validity of any limitation on its law-declaring competence:
It's only a limitation on what a court can do once it has jurisdiction, not a denial of jurisdiction, that can hurt a defendant. And if the court thinks the limitation invalid, it's always in a position to say so, and either to ignore it or let the defendant go free. Crowell v.
Benson and the Yakus case make that clear, don't they?1
20
And an enforcement court must make the examination not because of any specific constitutional guarantee (such as due process), but because that task is an essential attribute of the duty of the judicial department. "That's the reason, isn't it, why Hughes invokes Article III as well as the Fifth Amendment in Crowell v. Benson? As he says, the case was one 'where the question concerns the proper exercise of the judicial power in enforcing constitutional limitations' "121 The most neglected, and to my mind the most frustrating, part of the Dialogue is its discussion of the precise duties of an enforcement court. It seems to me incontrovertible that an enforcement court can and must examine 118. See L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 385-89 (arguing that due process requires full judicial review of law wherever the government engages in coercive conduct-whether the coercion is as a result of judicial or administrative process).
119. See supra note 17. 120. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 336. Technically Crowell was not an enforcement proceeding but a suit by the employer to set aside an administrative order-in effect, a suit for a declaration of nonliability. But the result would have determined the employer's duties in a subsequent enforcement suit. Thus Hart rightly insists that the court was "in the position of an enforcement court," and he persuasively argues that as a matter of statutory construction, a court should, as it did in Crowell, permit a prospective defendant to raise in an advance challenge all issues that would be open to him in a subsequent enforcement proceeding. Id. at 337-38. My use of "enforcement court" includes both contexts.
121. Id. at 337.
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MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W the validity of any limitations on its law-declaring competence, and that some limitations might offend specific constitutional guarantees. But does the article III "duty of the judicial department" mandate the invalidity of every limitation on the scope of law-declaring competence of an enforcement court? Is deference always impermissible? Hart apparently believes so. 12 2 His emphasis, I want to stress, is on Marbury as well as Crowell:
Q. The Crowell case also has a dictum that questions of law, including the question of the existence of evidence to support the administrative decision, must be open to judicial consideration. And you quoted Brandeis as saying that was necessary to the supremacy of law. Have those statements stood up?
A. If I can speak broadly and loosely, I'll say yes-they have stood up.
Shutting off the courts from questions of law determinative of enforceable duties was one of the things Yakus assumed that Congress could not do. To be sure, that was a criminal case; but there's no reason to suppose the Court would have made a different assumption if the sanction had been civil.
Name me a single Supreme Court case that has squarely held that, in a civil enforcement proceeding, questions of law can be validly withdrawn from the consideration of the enforcement court where no adequate opportunity to have them determined by a court has been previously accorded.
When you do, I'm going back to rethink Marbury v. Madison.
Q. You put a lot of weight on the point of whether an enforceable legal duty is involved, don't you?
A. Yes.'
23
The anti-deference thesis is, I recognize, somewhat ambiguously urged. Hart seems to require independent judicial determination of all questions of law, as is apparent from his discussion of criminal prosecutions like Yakus1 2 4 and his visible consternation over use of the then emerging reasonable-basisin-law standard of review in civil enforcement cases, 2 5 a matter to which I shall return. Still, less than complete precision inheres in such references as "shutting off the [enforcement] courts from questions of law," as having such questions "withdrawn" from those courts, or in stating (as a reviser's footnote adds) that " 'we find not a single clear-cut authority for unreviewability 122. Curiously, in an enforcement case Hart seems quite willing to accept without murmur judicial deference to administrative fact finding, id. at 338-39-a part of the otherwise "ordinary and humble" judicial task. The argument is not self-evident, as is indicated by the strained analysis in Crowell v. 
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW at the obligation end of the scale.' ",126 The crucial question, however, is not the bare existence of judicial review on questions of law but its precise scope. 1 2 7 The Dialogue provides no basis for any halfway house for an enforcement court on "legal" questions; Hart's thesis, as Jaffe paraphrases it, seems to demand that "insofar as the judicial power is invoked in the enforcement of [administrative] order[s], a court must apply all of the relevant law."' 28 If Hart's position is in fact consistent with some measure of deference, his analysis is, at the very least, in need of very considerable clarification.
B. Criticism
Hart contrasts enforcement proceedings with "denials" of jurisdiction to plaintiffs complaining of unfavorable administrative conduct. In the latter cases, the court is not being asked to establish and enforce the plaintiff's own legal duties; rather, plaintiff seeks judicial assistance to redress unfavorable administrative action. 129 In denial of jurisdiction cases, unlike enforcement proceedings, the important questions are, Hart insists, whether there is a substantive right to judicial review 3 0 -a point on which the distinction between coercive' 31 and noncoercive 32 administrative action may be important-and whether vindication of any such right may be confined by Congress to the state courts.
133
There is intuitive appeal to this structure. The nature of the judicial duty of article III courts is made to vary with whether the court is hurting people, 126. Id. at 341 n.20 (quoting 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 104 (1958)). 127. Professor Jaffe is guilty of eliding these different issues in his discussion of Hart. He cites Hart's analysis for the proposition of a constitutional right to review without noting that Hart was concerned with the scope of review, see L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 383-84.
128. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 384 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 129. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 344-59. As indicated in supra note 120, this category does not include cases where plaintiff's suit anticipates a future enforcement proceeding against him.
130. The right may stem from the due process clause, or from the specific provisions of the bill of rights. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 520-24, 543-51 (1970). Or it might be thought to inhere in the constitutional provision concerning habeas corpus, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 357.
131. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 348-60. 132. Id. at 344-48. This includes, as a special case, id. at 344, cases where plaintiff seeks review of the denial of an administrative order that would impose duties on other private persons. Hart treats this issue as part of the larger issue of plaintiff right of access to courts to enforce the duties of other private parties. Id. at 344-46. But where that issue manifests itself as a denial of an administrative order, it is, as Hart observes generally, closely akin to the general problem of noncoercive administrative orders.
133. The denial of jurisdiction is not self-executing, wholly beyond judicial scrutiny. E.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850). Hart remarks that "a necessary postulate of constitutional government" is a requirement that "a court must always be available to pass on claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to provide such process if the claim is sustained." Hart & Wechsler, supra note 17, at 336. The source of this implication is not made clear. In any event, a right to judicial review does not automatically translate into access to the federal courts, since, as Hart recognizes, the state courts can discharge the requirement. [Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W or simply refusing to help them. 134 Where an article III court is itself the medium for the application of coercive governmental power, the judicial duty is that of independent law exposition. Otherwise, the question is whether due process or some other provision of the Constitution grants a right of judicial access to some court, if not an article III court. But Hart's analysis is, I think, in the end unsatisfying even on its own terms. The distinction between enforcement and nonenforcement courts is not only incomplete, it rests upon an undefended and unpersuasive constitutional premise.
Hart's treatment of what he characterizes as "denial of jurisdiction" warrants close examination. Hart focuses upon complete denials of jurisdiction to challenges by private parties complaining of unfavorable administrative conduct. 35 Here the central problem has been the right to any judicial review, not the scope of review. 136 But the now far more common pattern is that of "restricted review." The court is given statutory jurisdiction to review an administrative order such as the denial of a government benefit, but one or more of its functions are restricted by a deference principle; for example, judicial review of facts may be confined to a substantial-basis-in-the-record standard, and judicial review of law limited to a determination whether the administrative order has a reasonable basis in law. Restricted review implicates not the right to judicial review, but its scope. The restricted court is like the enforcement court: each has jurisdiction; each has the function of law declaration restricted; and each "is always in the position to say [that the limitation is invalid]." Hart assumes without discussion 137 that where a complete denial of jurisdiction would be valid, restricted judicial review is also permissible. But this is true only if we focus on coercion rather than judicial involvement in thinking about the nature of the judicial duty. From the latter perspective, the matter looks quite different. In a denial of jurisdiction case, 
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW the court plays no further role if the preclusion is valid; the parties are left where they were before entering the courthouse. In a restricted review case, as in an enforcement proceeding, "judicial power" is brought to bear to resolve the controversy in an authoritative manner.
Functionally, Hart's definition of an enforcement court exempts private suits against public officials to enforce their statutory duties from a demand that courts supply all the relevant law. But so long as the court has general jurisdiction to render a final judgment, why should the permissible limitations on the court's law-declaring competence vary with whether the private litigant is asserting rights rather than defenses? This is a particularly troublesome question given Hart's concession that the law-declaring competence of a nonenforcement court cannot be restricted on constitutional issues.' 38 Moreover, it should be recalled that Hart cites both Crowell and Marbury in addressing the validity of limitations on enforcement courts with respect to conventional legal issues. But Marbury, of course, was itself a proceeding to enforce the duties of a public official.1
39
To my eye, the Dialogue leaves undefended the proposition that the nature of the judicial duty mandated by article III in cases in which the court has jurisdiction to enter a final judgment should turn on whether the individual's rights, duties or "interests" are at stake. Such a position cannot be derived from the language of article III, the thinking of the Framers, or the long history of judicial concern with the protection of private rights. Nor is the position functionally appealing, whether the judicial duty be viewed institutionally (law declaration is what courts "do") or in terms of the benefits supposedly conferred upon litigants by the independent article III tribunals. 4 0 It seems to me far more congruent with the premises of article III, as stated and as they have evolved in our legal tradition, to insist that exercises of "the judicial power of the United States" cannot vary with whether a private litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant, so long as the court is expected to enter a final judgment on the merits of the claim.
Further exploration of Hart's analysis can be pretermitted, however. A significant run of administrative law cases will fall into his enforcement court category, and we may take this as the strongest case for the proposition that the Constitution controls the degree of deference that article III courts may properly accord "reasonable" agency interpretations of statutory law. If it does not, Hart's emphasis on the special character of enforcement courts possesses no real utility insofar as it is directed to this issue. 138 . See supra notes 62 & 63. 139. Marbury might be explained as prefiguring the insight that "entitlements" can constitute "property," but if that rationale were adopted, it would sweep into the enforcement category much of the current judicial review of government largesse, to say nothing of the cases involving administrative coercion. Marbury, however, cannot be so contained. Whether or not the property label is affixed to the particular government largesse at issue, the object of a suit seeking to review its administrative denial can always be plausibly structured as an enforcement proceeding, an action to vindicate a legal duty against an otherwise unwilling public official. The current fashion is to decry the sweeping delegations of law-making authority conferred upon administrative agencies. 47 But any of the proposed formulae for limiting legislative delegations acknowledges that considerable 144. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982 308-09 (1976) . But this is a weak point, since they gave no attention to, nor could they have envisaged, the dimensions of modern delegation. Cf. Grundstein, supra note 3, at 304 (anti-delegation principle limited to presidential delegations and wholly inapplicable to delegations to administrative agencies).
148. Dean Freedman, for example, would revive earlier suggestions that Congress must resolve "controverted" issues of policy. Freedman, supra note 4, at 80. Professor Barber also would require that Congress resolve "salient" policy issues. S. Barber, supra note 141, at 44, 49-51. Unless these terms are used in a Pickwickian sense, they entail considerable subsidiary administrative law-making authority.
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problem is considerably simplified. Judicial deference to agency "interpretation" of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency. 49 To take a very modest example, Congress may, within limits, expressly authorize an agency to define "employees" within the labor acts through the exercise of substantive rule-making power. 50 Precisely the same kind of law-making delegation is achieved if, instead, Congress mandates judicial deference on that issue to either an "interpretive" agency rule or to the results of agency adjudication having "a reasonable basis in law." In each instance, the crucial judicial question is the scope of the authority delegated to the agency. There is, therefore, no constitutional significance to the asserted distinction between substantive and interpretive rule making;' 5 ' if interpretive rule making is coupled with a Hearst-like deference principle, it is, from a legal perspective at least, the functional equivalent of substantive rule-making authority.
5 2 Where deference is not given to an interpretive rule, the result is that norm elaboration authority has not been delegated to the administrative agency; the agency rule simply constitutes advice to the public as to the position which the agency is prepared to enforce and, ultimately, to defend in court.
It is in light of agency competence to make law that the "duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" must be evaluated. The question is put whether "the power of the Congress to define the law's content give [s] Congress unlimited discretion to allocate between the judiciary and the executive the power to interpret the law as it is enforced against the citizen's person or property?'1 53 It may very well be that some specific constitutional provisions (such as the first, fifth, and sixth amendments) are relevant here as limitations.'5 And the nondelegation doctrine of article I could impose some limits at least at the margins, prohibiting, for example, a legislative scheme that is tantamount to making the agency interpretation of the reach of its statutory mandate wholly conclusive upon the courts. 55 [Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W prepared to rethink fundamentally the role of public administration in our constitutional order, article III, standing alone, is not violated by judicial deference to administrative construction of law. Enforcement of other constitutional restrictions aside, the only judicial task is to determine what statutory authority has been conferred upon the administrative agency. 15 Once it has done so, the court has discharged its duty to say what the law is.
15 This is no novel perception. Robert Stern put it accurately long ago:
The duty of the courts in reviewing the administrative decision for error of law is to see that the agency has stayed within the bounds for the exercise of discretion fixed by Congress, and that it has applied the statutory standards and no others. As long as the agency does so, the courts are not to substitute their judgment ....
[T]he function of the reviewing court in determining the "law" in this field is to search for legislative intention, which of course would include an intention to vest the administrator with discretionary power, and then to decide whether the administrative ruling is consistent with it.1 58 To say that the "court-not the agency-must decide what the statute means" seems to me potentially misleading, at least without elaboration.1
59
To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it must decide what has been committed to the agency. Frequently the court will (or should) understand the statutory mandate as directing it, not the agency, to supply all or most of the relevant meaning. In these circumstances, the agency view is a datum, a highly relevant one, but a datum only; "it is only one input in the interpretational equation."'1 60 On other occasions, to borrow from Brandeis, "the function of the courts is not one of review but essentially of control-the function of keeping [agencies] within their statutory authority."''
1 The court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible criteria. In such an empowering arrangement, responsibility for meaning is shared between court and agency; the judicial role is to specify what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all that it does mean. In this context, the court is not abdicating its constitu- 
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COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW tional duty to "say what the law is" by deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is simply applying the law as "made" by the authorized law-making entity. Indeed, it would be violating legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-making authority.
B. Hearst Publications
The well-known case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications1 62 is a paradigmatic illustration of the foregoing principles. Hearst involved the status of adult newsboys as "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act. The Court applied the reasonableness standard to this "specific [agency] application of a broad statutory term,' '1 1 3 but only after independently determining that the Act was not intended to incorporate either specific state law or a generally distilled common-law standard for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors. 1 6 4 Rather, the Court opined, the statute's content must be discerned "primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation,"' ' 6 5 upon which it expounded at considerable length. 10 The judicial duty was, in the end, not that of fully defining the meaning of "employees," but one of instructing the agency as to the boundaries of its law-making competence.1 6 7
Hart's description of Hearst, concededly an enforcement case, is worth examining:
Q. How do you explain cases like Gray v. Powell, and National
Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.? ... Didn't these cases allow the agencies to make final determinations of questions of law? A. That depends on how you define "law". I think Professor Davis is right in saying that the term "law" in the first sentence I quoted from Justice Brandeis has to be read "as excluding the body of rules and principles that grow out of the exercise of administrative discretion"-at least while the rules are in process of crystallizing. Davis, Administrative Law 34 (1941) .
In recent years we've recognized increasingly a permissible range of administrative discretion in the shaping of judicially enforceable duties. How wide that discretion should be, and what are the appropriate ways to control it, are crucial questions in adminis- (1981) . There the Court agreed with the Board that all confidential employees were not impliedly excluded from the Act's coverage. While extensively analyzing the Board's views and paying respect to its expertise, the Court quite plainly reserved this issue for its own independent judgment. Id. at 222-26. But the Court invoked Hearst in sustaining the board on a narrower issue-the implied exclusion of those employees possessing access to confidential labor relations information. It was enough, the Court said, that this aspect of the Board's conclusion had a "reasonable basis in law." Id. at 228.
[Vol. 83:1 MARBURY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LA W trative law. But so long as the courts sit to answer the questions, the spirit of Brandeis' statement is maintained. And, since discretion by hypothesis is not law, the letter of it is not in question.1 6 8 This account is not satisfying. The opposition of "discretion" to "law" cannot dissolve Harts problem.
69 Jaffe seems to me entirely correct in describing administrative discretion as the process of combining statutorily relevant factors into a decision. There can be "no determining rule for combining such factors,'1 70 although a court could properly determine whether one or more factors had been given either excessive or insufficient weight.' 71 But the result of the exercise of discretion is, as it was in Hearst, an administrative formulation of a rule of law.1
72
For constitutional purposes at least, the Hearst deference doctrine cannot plausibly be confined to cases of statutory "application" as opposed to statutory "construction," or to "mixed" rather than "pure" questions of law.
7 3 Administrative application of law is administrative formulation of law whenever it involves elaboration of the statutory norm.1 74 In any event, distinctions between "construction" and "application" have never been em- 172. See also Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 102 S. Ct. 720 (1982) . The Court there sustained the Board's view that a bargaining impasse does not justify an employer's unilateral withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit, concluding that the Board had "confined itself within the zone of discretion entrusted to it by Congress," id. at 727. The Court added that the dissent "is quite right that this case turns in major part on the extent to which the courts should defer to the Board's judgment with respect to the critical factors involved." Id. 173. If such lines were viable it might be argued that such limited judicial deference to administrative construction of law does not involve according agencies law-making power in any significant sense. Analogy might be made to the distribution of functions between judge and jury on the "application" of statutory norms to facts. That issue, it is contended, cannot be resolved ex ante by appeal to intrinsic differences between questions of law and of fact, but instead must be decided functionally, on a statute-by-statute basis. H. Hart and A. Sacks, supra note 119, at 369-85. Whether the judge should reserve the issue for himself as one of "law" depends upon an assessment, albeit often intuitively made, of such factors as how much more norm elaboration can be meaningfully provided, how fact-dependent the specific problem is, and how importunately the situation disclosed by the evidence calls for certainty and predictability. A similar condition obtains in the allocation of functions between court and agency in the administrative law context, it could be argued. L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 576. But even so, this parallel is not illuminated by the judge-jury analogy. Speaking generally, but I think accurately, little significant norm elaboration is left to the jury, and such as there is is entirely swallowed up in the ad hoc character of the jury's verdict. By contrast, the deference standard, in anything but a very weak form, suggests significant agency discretion in elaboration of the statutory norm, even accepting the premise that the agency is confined to employing judicially approved criteria. Presumably, an agency decision could go either way, and would be sustained by a reviewing court. Such a power to choose authoritatively (and, unlike a jury, with precedential effect) among significantly different modes of conduct seems to me, as it has to others, to constitute agency law making, id. at 575-76, with the court accepting the administrative version of the statute's content.
174. See the discussion in L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 562-64, and sources cited in Levin, supra note 11, at 337-38 & 339.
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found, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as the ultimate guardian and assurance of the limits set upon [administrative] power by the constitutions and legislatures."' 89 But judicial review of administrative action stands on a different footing from constitutional adjudication, both historically and functionally. In part no doubt because alternative methods of control, both political and administrative in nature, are available to confine agencies within bounds, there has never been a pervasive notion that limited government mandated an all-encompassing judicial duty to supply all of the relevant meaning of statutes. Rather, the judicial duty is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic act.
B. Boundary-Setting in Constitutional Adjudication
What is striking, in the end, is that there is far less discontinuity between the role of judicial review in administrative law and constitutional law than one might suspect given the formal demands of the independent judgment rule. A conception of the judicial role as restraining only ultra vires administrative action in fact characterizes much of the Court's role in constitutional adjudication. Wherever the rationality test obtains, Marbury's demand of independent judicial judgment is a weak one, functionally equivalent to deference, with the judicial role confined to policing boundaries. Congress, for example, is empowered to spend for the "general welfare"' 9 0 and to take property for a "public use. ' 
"
19 The Court must determine what these words mean. In so doing, it could, for example, hold that spending to relieve the economic dislocations caused by the modern industrial order is not among the goals included in spending for the "general welfare," or that takings that do not result in wide public use of the taken property are not for a "public use." Congress would, in turn, be bound by such conclusions. But once the Court has determined, as it now has, that Congress can spend and take to achieve a virtually unlimited range of goals, the constitutional standard recedes into a deep background with the result that the yolitical branches are empowered to supply much of the operational content of the constitutional clauses.1 9 2 The Court, in short, simply determines whether Congress has exceeded the outer boundaries of a very wide domain for choice. The same analysis holds true, of course, where the rational basis test governs substantive review under the due process or equal protection clauses. The standard is virtually empty because its
